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First comer advantages and network effects are frequently stated as among the most 
important determinants of market structures and this is particularly relevant for 
network economies including telecommunications markets. Connected to this, 
regulatory tools such as number portability have frequently been used to reduce 
market imperfections resulting from these effects. Within this context, this paper aims 
to analyze the role of these factors in creating the current market structure of Turkish 
GSM sector. By examining relevant data such as development of market shares in a 
historical perspective and by making use of consumer surveys, it is concluded that 
the dominant operator has benefited from being first comer in the market and 
established a stable market share (power) due to network effects that are used by 
this firm deliberately to entrench its position especially in the form of switching costs, 
scale economies, brand image and tariff (on-net vs. off-net pricing) differentiation; 
however, it is also observed that introduction of number portability lead to reduction in 
switching costs, increasing market competition.  
 
Keywords:  First comer advantages, Network effects, Mobile telephony 
(GSM),number portability, Competition, Regulation and Consumer preferences. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper begins with the brief review of ‘first comer advantages’ and ‘network 
effects’ along with the discussion of new product (service) diffusion in a related 
market. In addition to this, one of the competition tool namely number portability has 
been analyzed in terms of its costs and benefits to see the effectiveness of this 
instrument in reducing first comer advantages and network effects. Afterwards, the 
structure and concentration level of Turkish GSM market have been discussed in 
different perspectives to explore the role of these advantages. In this context 
historical developments and market shares of the operator’s have been assessed to 
give a general picture of the sector. Then, some of the structural reasons for the poor 
competitive performance have been stated in general terms. In the fourth part recent 
implementation of number portability and differentiation strategies used by the three 
operators have been evaluated in terms of services offered, pricing plans and 
promotional activities such as mobile handset provision. Finally, consumer 
preferences have been studied to give some explanations to the current structure of 
the market by using consumer surveys.  
 
2. Review of Theoretical Concepts 
 
It can be argued that diffusion of new technology
2 (in the form of new product and/or 
new service) creates a new market/s in which competitors struggle to gain market 
share at the expense of each others. Before analyzing this process in a case study, it 
may be suitable to begin with brief evaluation of these topics. 
 
2.1. Diffusion (of new product and/or service) 
 
As known by everyone, for any innovation to be successful in market place people 
should demand it. In other words without diffusion, innovation would have no major 
economic and social impact in any society (Hall, 2005). Here diffusion is defined as 
the process by which market actors adopt a new product (service)
3 or substitute 
                                                 
2 In the article, innovation is used in the meaning of new product and service to create a new market, e.g. mobile 
telephony technology leading to mobile telephony services (voice, data transmission etc.) and related products 
such as mobile handsets. 
3 In this context, new products and services are used interchangeably, since it is especially difficult to 
differentiate between mobile technology, mobile telephony service and handsets (products) in general terms for   3
previous (older) product by the new one. However, the speed of diffusion process 
differs between each product and service depending on various factors. Indeed, 
Geroski (2000) mentions the fact that in some cases it takes very long period of time 
for new products (technologies) to be adopted by people (even by those who seem 
most likely benefit from their use). In this respect, Rosenberg (1972) similarly have 
made the observation that while this process takes time in general terms, there exists 
wide variations in the adoption rate of different products. On the other hand, learning 
of how to use these new products and continuous feedback relations between users 
and producers (firms) lead to -again continuous- improvements in the original 
products. Related to our main topic, evolution of mobile telephony (GSM) can be 
given as an example of the role of both supply and demand side influences (and their 
interactions) on the continuous improvement of these products such as development 
of short message services (sms) and later multimedia messaging services (mms) and 
other various value added services (internet banking, gaming applications etc.) used 
from a mobile handset along with the improvement of data transmission capacity of 
mobile telephony (3G technology). 
 
As stated above, diffusion speed of a new product depends on various factors. 
According to Rogers (1995), there exist five analytical categories to account for the 
adoption rate in personnel level; relative advantage of innovation, its compatibility, 
complexity of innovation, triability and observability. The rapid diffusion of mobile 
telephony all over the world, in fact is due to the relative advantage (mobility in the 
first place, of course) of this new product over the comparable product (and to some 
extent substitutable), fixed telephony
4. Furthermore, related to the second 
characteristics, mobile telephony is compatible with potential users’ way of doing 
things and with social norms. In addition to these factors, both triability (that can be 
tested by users) and observability (evaluation after trial and learning from other 
people’s experiences) features of this new product all have played roles in the rapid 
diffusion process virtually in every country of the world. On the other hand, it is 
                                                                                                                                                          
our purposes. In other words, from the demand side perspective, the important thing for a consumer is to use this 
technology to make calls, transmit data etc. without taking into consideration many technical details. 
4 After nearly twenty years from the commercial implementation of GSM; more than 700 GSM Networks in 
various countries of the world are expected to carry more than 16 billion minutes of calls and six billion text 
messages, GSM’s global subscriber base is forecast to have grown by 1.2 million and more than six million 
GSM handsets are estimated to have been manufactured in just ‘one day’ time period according to 
Telecommunications predictions of Deloitte Touche (2008).   4
evident that external factors also influence this process. Promotion activities of 
companies like advertising campaigns, provision of free handset in return for a 
predefined contract period can all be stated for examples of this external category 
used by producers to increase adoption rate of this new product.  
 
In this context, another interesting phenomena is that old technology itself reacts to 
the new one and this also has an effect on the adoption rate. Of course for the 
complete struggle and elimination of old technology, it should be perfect 
substitutability relationship between them as in the example of ice harvesting industry 
in which the availability of electric refrigerators effectively end the harvested ice era 
(Utterback, 1994). In our case, there is no perfect substitutability relation available, 
but it is seen that more and more people have been using mobile telephony instead 
of fixed one (i.e. fixed to mobile substitution). For this reason, there has been a 
continuous product improvement in this category also, with particular emphasis on 
the (still) superior features like data transmission (internet usage) capability (e.g. 
upgrade of copper line capacity, namely ADSL technology) of the fixed line. In 
addition to this, because of convergence there have been some attempts to develop 
hybrid service offerings (e.g. Turk Telekom’s service offerings together with GSM 
operator Avea in Turkey) by fixed line operators to create alternatives to the 
customers.  
 
In many empirical analyses, it is generally observed that diffusion path usually follows 
an ‘S-shaped’ curve. Starting from what can be called experimental users and from 
very low levels, diffusion speeds up in later periods and the level stabilizes as 
approaching satiation. Apart from the above mentioned issues both in individual and 
social dimensions, one can observe different shapes (varying steepness) of S-curve 
in each specific case by considering different economic factors such as costs 
(financial costs, uncertainty) and benefits of new technology.  
 
Having discussed the diffusion process of a new product in general terms, it may be 
appropriate to proceed with one of the important determinants of diffusion rate; 
‘network effects’. 
 
   5
2.2. Network Effects 
 
Network effects can be seen as the process by which the value of a product (and 
firm’s market share) increases through increase in diffusion rate of this product; while 
-at the same- time consumers make their adoption decisions depending on the 
increasing diffusion rate, further expanding the network. According to Goolsbee and 
Klenow (2002) network effects occur when the value of participating in a network 
increases as more people participate in the network. Birke and Swan (2005) asserts 
that main assumption of the network effects literature is that the size of the network 
matters to the individual customer and that utility is a function (in linear or logistic 
form) of network size, to varying degrees depending on industry specific 
characteristics (e.g. availability of substitutable products complicates and in many 
cases slows the adoption decision). For example, in literal networks such as 
telephone or e-mail systems as well as in complementary goods such as DVD and 
DVD players, one can find such a relationship between adoption and value of the 
network. Indeed, this is particularly relevant for network goods including mobile 
telephony and internet in which the availability of use (communication compatibility in 
our case) depends on the existence of an established user base. In other words, the 
value of a mobile telephony network increases proportionally as more people decide 
to subscribe to it, and in this process potential users –to a large extent- make their 
decisions (of course there are many other factors; price, quality, coverage etc.) by 
looking into the network size of alternative operators. As in the case of information 
cascade process (Geroski, 2000; 618-619), when network effects (externalities) 
present, ‘initial choice’ of product has critical importance since this creates ‘lock in’, in 
turn leading to ‘bandwagon’ result, that accelerates the adoption rate of the product.  
 
There are two kinds of network effects; direct and indirect types (Birke and Swann, 
2005). Direct network effects arise in situations where users benefit directly from 
other users of the same network. One can find this type of benefits in virtually every 
network industry including telecommunications markets in which a subscriber to a 
network can communicate to another one in the same network without bothering 
additional costs (off-net vs. on-net pricing) and technical arrangements (compatibility 
and interconnection). On the other hand, indirect network effects appear since more 
and more complementary products have been developed in response to increasing   6
network size (to satisfy demand). The struggle between VHS and Betamax video 
(VCR) systems can be given as an example where indirect network effects were 
crucial for the selection of dominant design; in this case VHS format although it was 
not on the technical frontier in the words of Tushman and Anderson (1990). 
Furthermore, we have been witnessing another similar ‘era of ferment’ in the 
category of new generation DVD systems, namely; HD DVD and Blue Ray systems. 
Here, owing to Sony’s deal with Warner Bross to market their films in Blue Ray 
format led to elimination of another system (Dubner, 2008), showing the importance 
of complementary products in the context of indirect network externalities. Birke and 
Swann (2005) claim that, indirect network effects are not as important as direct 
network effects for the mobile telephony market; however with the advent of 3G 
technology, availability of more data services (complementary services creating 
indirect network effects) may increase the adoption rate of this next generation 
system (increasing the importance of indirect effects).  
 
2.2.1. Role of standards and entry regulation 
 
Another important factor in the network effects is the ‘technological standards’. Of 
course, if there is a predetermined standard, the diffusion speed increases since this 
will reduce uncertainties of consumers’ (users) related to the new technology and at 
the same time increase the size of the market by reducing production costs (i.e. lower 
prices because of economies of scale). In fact, Gruber and Verboven (2001) affirm 
that with standards the market should grow faster, reducing the search and switching 
costs for the users. However, they also point out the negative aspects of selecting a 
standard (instead of market decision) in that this one may not be the optimal 
technology and once the decision is made then because of ‘lock in’, it will be very 
difficult to develop alternative technologies
5.  
 
In standard setting process, governments are the main actors (in some cases 
together with firms, industry associations) to make the final decision. According to 
Gruber and Verboven (2001),  there are various policy issues that governments 
should take into consideration when making a decision among alternatives. The main 
                                                 
5 However, market process by itself also may lead to selection of inferior alternatives (not optimal in a sense) as 
seen –for example-in QWERTY keyboard selection over alternatives by the market.   7
question in the first place is the decision of whether a single standard or multiple 
standards should be adopted. Here, one should note the fact that international 
organizations, mainly International Telecommunications Union (ITU) has actively 
involved in the development of 3G standards and adoption of it by many countries 
throughout the world. As mentioned above, these two alternatives have both positive 
and negative consequences not foreseen at the time of decision. In this respect, they 
argue that setting a technology standard like GSM in Europe helps to develop the 
market faster than the historical examples where analogue (previous telecom) 
systems were competing in the market. Second question is related to the number of 
licenses (entry regulation) that can be given by the governments, subject to 
frequency limitations (i.e. technological limitations for the number of firms) and this 
decision is also important related to the diffusion process of this technology. Firstly, it 
is clear (and of course simple) that the actual timing is important for diffusion process 
to start at the beginning. Here regulatory decisions (license dates, delays) are the 
main factors for the introduction of this product since no one can provide mobile 
telephony service without a license from government (related agency, whether a 
ministry or an agency). Besides this, Gruber and Verboven (2001) mention that 
competition speeds up diffusion indicating the importance of several competing firms 
in the market. Apart from this timing of these licenses are also crucial for the creation 
of the market (i.e. simultaneous or sequential entry), and this will also be analyzed 
the ‘first comer advantages’ context, after looking some case studies in different 
countries. Thirdly, the license conditions (whether it is given by auctions, beauty 
contests, first come first served etc.) play a role in both creation of market and in 
diffusion process. Although not related to our main topic, it is sufficient to say that 
giving too much emphasis on state revenues (i.e. fee for GSM frequency) may lead 
to investment failures of licensees later on since these huge license fees can impose 
heavy burden as in the case of Germany’s experience in 3G auctions
6, which in turn 




                                                 
6For example, please see ‘ITU chief criticized handling of 3G auctions’ available at 
http://www.3gnewsroom.com/3g_news/nov_02/news_2749.shtml, ‘3G Cost billions: Will it ever live up to its 
hype.’ available at thttp://www.iht.com/articles/2006/07/30/business/3G.php?page=3   8
2.2.2. Case-1: United Kingdom’s GSM Market 
 
Birke and Swann (2007) have evaluated network effects in the UK mobile 
telecommunications market. Firstly, it is argued that there are network effects that 
bring about by mobile phone operators in the market. As mentioned above, these 
effects are especially important for these networks in that operators can further 
manipulate these effects to augment their benefits and these strategies are called 
‘tariff-mediated network effects’ by Laffont et.al. (1998). More specifically, a firm is 
able to differentiate between on-net (calls to the same network) and off-net (calls to 
other networks) prices by setting these prices higher. It is expected that this ability 
coupled with other factors such as the initial size of network (i.e. mostly due to first 
comer advantages) and existence of switching costs give competitive advantage for 
bigger firms in terms of bigger network and economies of scale.  
 
Within this context, it is stressed that since users can call each operator (network), 
the important thing is the difference between on-net and off-net prices as compared 
to network sizes of each operator and they test the effect of this differentiation in UK 
GSM market. According to their results, the high price of off-net calls can not only be 
a result of market power, but can be significant source of market power which can be 
used to pre-empt entry by new competitors. One may argue, here, that this ability can 
be seen as a strategic asset of the firm by which competitive advantage is achieved 
and sustained in the market. In fact, creating entry barriers are among the strategies 
that can be adopted by incumbent firms once a market share is achieved in the 
context of competitive forces approach developed by Porter (Teece et. al., 1997). 
Secondly, they find that network affects in the GSM market seem to work both at the 
network level (size matters) and at the micro-level (in household, friend groups). 
Besides this, in another study by the same authors (2005) it is founded that social 
networks (in their case undergraduate students at the University of Nottingham 
Business School) strongly influence the selection decision of users more than the 
total size of network. In this study, it is concluded that students coordinate their 
subscription decision to minimize their expenditures (i.e. minimization of on-net vs. 
off-net differential) since most of the calls are made within this social groups along 
with household members. 
   9
From these discussions, it can be said that network externalities both because of the 
overall size of the network (including household members and friend group selection 
in micro level) and tariff- mediated network effects used by operators lead to increase 
(and decrease for some of others) in market powers of operators in the market. In 
this regard, one can ask the question that, ‘to what extent is first comer advantage 
important for market structure?’ or ‘is there really a first comer advantage for any 
operator in the struggle (for market share) between undertakings in the market?’ 
 
2.3. First Comer Advantages 
 
To begin with there exist many definitions of ‘first comer’ in the literature. First of all, it 
is seen that instead of ‘first comer’, alternative words may have been used in different 
articles but more or less in the same meaning, including; ‘market pioneer’, ‘pioneer’ 
and ‘first mover’. For example, Golder and Tellis (1993) defined market pioneer as 
the first firm to sell in a new product category. Robinson and Fornel (1985) describe 
this as the first entrant in a new market.  
 
According to Golder and Tellis (1993), order of market entry is critical to companies’ 
survival and success. If early entrants have advantages in various aspects such as 
lower costs (due to scale economies), product quality (because of continuous 
improvement etc.), widespread distribution channels and brand name reputation, 
then we can say that these firms have benefited from early entry (of course there 
exists many other factors for success). In this context, Mathews (2002; 468) suggests 
that first mover advantages stress the barriers to entry established by first comers 
(firms) through above mentioned (scale economies etc.) factors. On the other hand, 
as found virtually in each issue in economics, there is also the other side of the coin. 
Again as stated in Mathews (2002) in some cases firms make strategic decisions to 
enter later than the pioneer firm to see the market evolution, demand for new product 
and to develop substitutable but cheaper (at the same time with equal and/or higher 
quality) products like IBM’s late entry strategy in personal computer market 
7.  
 
                                                 
7 For our purposes I proceed with advantages of first mover concept that are discussed in the literature.   10
There are several reasons for the emergence of first mover advantages from both 
demand and supply side factors. Klemperer (1987) points out the importance of 
‘switching costs’ in the demand side considerations. These costs benefit the first 
comer firms and consist of initial investments (by users) in adapting to a seller’s 
products, learning effects and contractual obligations. Contractual obligations are 
especially important for telecommunications markets since it seen that every operator 
provide cost reductions, bundled offerings (e.g. free handset, provision of different 
services etc.) in return for longer term contracts to create switching costs for 
consumers. The extreme example for this marketing strategy can be found in the 
Turkish GSM market in which dominant operator provided certain handsets (e.g. 
Ericsson) with sim locks (i.e. these devices could only be used in this network) 
creating entry barriers to the other operator of this period (Telsim)
8. However more 
moderate marketing strategies in the form of giving free handsets for one year 
contracts (with predetermined monthly fees) are the most common practices adopted 
by European operators in these countries. From this it is clear that due to switching 
costs, late comer firms have to convince (in fact compensate) the users of the first 
comer’s network (services) to transfer to their networks. 
 
As argued in network effects section, these externalities together with tariff- mediated 
marketing strategies (on-net and off-net pricing) also give advantages for first comers 
especially in telecommunications markets. Moreover, Schmalansee (1981)  allege 
that uncertainty about the quality of late comer’s products also benefits the first 
comer’s market position. In practice, it is frequently observed that first comers (also 
for early comers) try to establish brand and quality image by aggressive advertising 
campaigns. On the other hand, scale economies, sunk costs and cost efficiencies 
(from continuous improvement and learning) emerge from supply side as benefits to 
first movers. In this respect, a potential (newcomer) firm should take into account 
sunk costs before entering the market since these cannot be recovered once they 
have been incurred and this factor has a definite effect on the entry decision of firms 
in certain markets including mobile telephony. Indeed, this was the main reason for 
lack of demand for the second GSM 1800 license in Turkey. Here Is Bank-Telecom 
                                                 
8 Briefly, Telsim complained about this offering and claimed that this act violated Competition Law. In the end, 
Competition Authority decided in favor of this operator, and this enabled company to provide these handsets 
with its sim cards. (Competition Board decision No: 01-35/347-95)   11
Italia consortium got the first license in return for app. 2.5 billion US$
9 and this act 
can be considered as an effective strategic (and irreversible) commitment (Teece 
et.al., 1997) to preempt (deter) other market entry considering the amount of what 
can be called ‘sunk cost’ owing to the condition that the other license’s minimum fee 
was also set 2.5 billion US$ according to auction procedure. Furthermore, scale 
economies are essential in telecommunications where scale economies lead to lower 
average costs for the incumbent operators. More specifically, Bijwaard et. al. (2008; 
249) assert that fixed costs occupy main part of the total cost (in the form of creating 
and maintaining network) as opposed to small marginal costs in telecommunications 
markets. Related to this an operator with the largest market share (in many cases, it 
is expected that first comer has this advantage) has the lowest average cost enabling 
the firm to lower tariffs (further increasing its market share due to lower prices). 
 
In addition to these considerations, one can find numerous empirical analyses related 
to first comer advantages in the literature
10. Lieberman and Montgomery (1998) draw 
some conclusions by reviewing the literature related to case studies. According to 
this, entry order effects occur, especially with respect to market share and first comer 
advantages vanish with the passage of time but are enhanced by longer lead times 
before competitive entry. This is especially relevant for telecommunications in which 
entry regulation result in longer lead times for incumbents (sequential licensing). 
Furthermore, the extent of first comer advantage differs between each product and 
geographic market. Lastly, they claim that other strategies (price, advertising, niche 
market selection etc.) are also crucial for market success in many cases. In fact, 
Golder and Tellis (1993) state the importance of continuous innovation in market 




                                                 
9 Please see ‘GSM ihalesinde satış gerçekleşmedi’ available at http://haber.turk.net/FLS/16764/GSM-ihalesi-
nde-satis-gerceklesmedi (in Turkish) 
10 On the contrary, some authors including Golder and Telis (1993) question the strong association between 
market entry and market share by pointing out the selection bias (i.e. in most of the studies the first entrants that 
have failed are left out of the sample). For this reason, they recommend extensive historical analysis in each case 
for the evaluation of this advantage. 
11 Although continuous improvement is still important for GSM market, I think that this is not a fundamental 
concern in telecommunications market, in which every firm provides (market) more or less same services as it is 
demonstrated in Turkey context (by examining different services -voice, sms, mms etc.- provided by each 
operator in this country).   12
2.3.1. Case-2: Early Mover Advantages in European Mobile Telephony Markets 
 
Bijwaard et. al. (2008) studied the effects of first comer advantages in European 
mobile telephony markets in the beginning of 1990’s. This time also coincided with 
liberalization attempts throughout the continent, including privatization of the 
incumbent and removal of monopoly rights of these incumbent telecom operators 
such as British Telecom in United Kingdom and Deutsche Telecom in Germany. 
However, GSM licenses were also given to these incumbents, making them first 
comers in these markets. Here one can see a distinctive feature of this market; 
market entry decision is not in the hands of any firm, governments determined the 
market entry timing, number of operators as mentioned in the previous part of this 
study. Apart from this, as expected, they state that in the initial stages, most of the 
demand was generated by firms and market size was gradually expanded starting 
from slow growth rates until the middle of 1990’s and more precisely after 1996 
diffusion rate has started to increase considerably, reaching more than 100 % 
penetration rates in many European Union countries. Their first observation is that 
most of the call volume was created by business sector in those times, and these 
firms naturally chose the network of the first comer operators. Secondly, they refer to 
quality differences between the first comers and later entrants since the latter needed 
time to build and improve (learning by doing in how to fix some errors) their networks 
and increase their coverage. This factor also undoubtedly worked in favor of the 
incumbent operators in each country of the continent. In addition to these factors, 
they argue that ‘switching costs’ and network effects’
12 further augmented the first 
mover advantages. In this context, other than contractual obligations used by 
operators, another factor may also have a role in switching costs; user’s investment 
(in a sense) in their numbers. In fact, it is especially true for business people since it 
is widely known that ‘phone number’ has became an identity (or valuable asset) so 
without ‘number portability’
13 (in the early days of market creation this was not 
possible due to technical constraints) this is also an important consideration for first 
mover advantages. 
                                                 
12 Since these are discussed with related examples in previous sections, only some additional aspects have been 
evaluated in this part. 
13 Even number portability has its own costs and benefits, so one should not expect straightforward results from 
this policy instrument (e.g. it is not a uniform fact that market leader has lost market share after the 
implementation of number portability).   13
With these initial observations, they pass on the next stage of their analysis. It is 
indicated that penetration (adoption) rate has followed ‘S-shaped’ curve, though in 
different steepness in each case. Secondly, they construct a model and test the 
relation between market entry sequence and market share developments of 
operators. According to their results, firstly it is best to enter as early as possible 
indicating early mover advantages mainly in the market creation stage (mostly) due 
to switching costs. Secondly, it is more difficult to enter a concentrated market
14. In 
their words, when the penetration rate is already large and other firms are operating 
in the industry, the long run market share for the late entrants to be reached small as 
compared to incumbent operators’ market shares. Besides this, they argue that it is 
more difficult to gain market share when the market shares of other operators are 
highly unequal. Furthermore they give an explanation for the country level differences 
(not strong according to them) in terms of market structure etc. by emphasizing the 
relative strength of the national regulators
15. Having stated these findings, it is also 
suggested that the decision related to licensing (i.e. simultaneous vs. sequential 
entry, license conditions and fees etc.) is crucial for later market structure and 
governments should very carefully devise this policy to avoid future problems 
(especially in terms of competition). The authors conclude with the limitations of their 
research by saying that the lack of data (e.g. pricing, costs, profits etc.) are the main 
reasons for not analyzing the effects of different developments in the market such as 
pre paid subscription and number portability on the market shares (and of course 
competitive level) of (first comers vs. late entrants) operators in the market. 
 
Having seen the impact of first comer advantages and network effects on the market 
structure, it is clear that –in most cases- some form of regulatory intervention is 
unavoidable to increase the competitive level in the market. As known, these 
interventions range from ex- ante measures such as accounting separation, 
transparency requirements to ex- post ones including application of competition law. 
In this respect number portability can be seen as another regulatory tool that can be 
used for market regulation. Indeed if one takes into account the fact that having a 
unique telephone number is some kind of investment, then the ability to choose 
                                                 
14 Here they use HHI index to calculate market concentration and I return this subject later in the main case 
study.  
15 They only argue that structural differences exist because of different competencies of regulators, but they do 
not make any (further) analysis in this subject.   14
alternative operators without changing this number will undoubtedly have beneficial 
affects to the competition by reducing first comer advantages and other network 
externalities.  
 
2.4. Mobile Number Portability (MNP) 
 
Number Portability can be defined as a facility that enables the subscriber to change 
its operator, geographical position and/or service type without changing subscriber 
number
16 , and the mobile term indicates that this process is applicable to only 
mobile numbers. As in all other regulations, the main aim of this tool is to increase 
consumer satisfaction by giving them more alternatives and increasing competition in 
the related market. In more detailed terms, there are five benefits accruing to 
consumers as a result of mobile number portability (Buehler et. al., 2006). In the first 
place, consumers that have changed their operators before the implementation of 
this process faced with switching costs. Secondly, those users that do not want to 
change their phone numbers (because of switching costs) but are unsatisfied with the 
services offered by their operators will have the ability to change them after MNP. On 
the other side of the coin, thirdly, callers do not have to bear additional search costs 
when calling others who change their operators with the same phone numbers (under 
MNP). More importantly, in the fourth category, all consumers –users- will benefit 
from increasing competition between operators (e.g. decreasing prices, promotional 
activities and campaigns). Indeed, Galbi (2001) emphasizes the fact that MNP lead to 
lower switching costs and this in turn force operators to devise more aggressive 
marketing campaigns to keep existing subscribers and to gain from rivals. Besides 
this, Viard (2004) also finds the competitive effects due to the introduction of MNP in 
the phone numbers starting with 800 in USA market. This study covers AT&T, MCI 
and Sprint and it is concluded that with the reduction in switching costs, the leading 
firm’s ability to operate independently from other operators have been reduced to a 
considerable extent. Finally, consumer welfare is also increased by reallocation of 
property rights after the implementation of MNP. For the people using their phone 
numbers in their businesses, this is especially important since –in a sense- they have 
made an investment in those numbers by making advertisement etc.  
                                                 
16 ‘Ordinance on Number Portability’ available at, www.btk.gov.tr   15
On the other hand, MNP has some costs that should be taken into consideration 
when making cost and benefit analysis
17. These in general terms can be classified 
into direct and indirect costs (Buehler and Haucap, 2004). First category is composed 
of set up costs (initial investments) and variable costs occurred in each number 
porting process that also covers operational expenditures. The loss of operator 
transparency forms the second category. In other words, callers may not know 
whether the called numbers have been ported or not in advance and this lead to 
indirect costs for those people. In the Ovum (2000) report this is included in the MNP 
costs but no quantitative analysis have been made by stating the difficulty of 
estimating such costs. This issue is nevertheless important since due to ‘consumer 
ignorance’ problem (Gans and King, 2000) MNP should be implemented along with 
regulations on call termination prices. In addition to this- as in all categories- 
regulatory authorities and operators should use different media sources to inform 
consumers to reduce so called ‘information asymmetries’ to some degree. Thirdly, 
some warning mechanisms such as use of different dial phone or voice message 
should be used to inform users and to minimize consumer ignorance problem. 
 
In practice, the impact of MNP on the market structure depends on several other 
factors and one can classify them in two categories. The first one can be called as 
external factors including regulatory environment (e.g., availability of cost accounting, 
call termination regulation etc.) and the competitive strategies and strengths of rival 
operators. In the second category, the issues in MNP itself will play a role in the 
forthcoming structural adjustment process and this includes various measures and 
procedures such as payment method (i.e. who pays the porting) and maximum 
allowed porting time and costing methodology
18. Indeed, it is emphasized that easier 
and convenient (e.g. free of charge for consumers) porting procedures have led to 
more demand in turn increasing competition in the market (OECD, 2008). For 
instance, in Singapore -one of the first MNP implementing country- some of the set 
up costs were charged to the users, who wanted to port their numbers, and for this 
reason demand for MNP did not reach considerable numbers for the early 
                                                 
17 One can find a few cost benefit analysis related to mobile number portability. For example, in the Korean 
market it was estimated that the cost of MNP was around 23,5 to 36,9 €, while the benefits were considerably 
above this figure (Nera and Smith, 1998). Another analysis made by Ofcom-previously Oftel- (1997) also 
confirmed this estimation; with the cost 36,4 € for set up and benefits (in total) were well above 110 €. 
18 Please see Annex-1 for some country examples for porting times.    16
implementation period in this country (Nera and Smith, 1998). However, looking into 
only ported numbers may not show the complete picture (i.e. benefits and 
competitive effects) taking into account the fact that users as a whole benefit from 
MNP as mentioned above, in the form of tariff reductions, new loyalty schemes, 
services and promotional offerings.  
 
After discussing network effects and the effects of MNP, it may be appropriate to start 
analyzing our main case study to see the impact of first comer advantages, network 
effects and the initial results of MNP. 
 
3. Turkey’s GSM Market  
 
The telecommunications market is one of the fastest growing sectors of the Turkish 
economy. Growth was mainly fuelled by major capital investments in the second half 
of the '80's and the '90's that aimed the expansion and modernization of the 
telecommunications infrastructure and the diversification of available services. Turkey 
got acquainted with mobile telecommunication technology in the year 1986, during 
the initiation stage of "Nordic Mobile telephone" (NMT) systems’ utilization. Through 
NMT, service furnished to nearly 114.000 subscribers
19. With the second half of the 
90’s with the advent of GSM technologies, telecommunication market became one of 
the most attractive sector in the economy. Furthermore -in 2000’s- with the 
liberalization of other telecom markets and the establishment of Telecommunications 
Authority (TA)
20, the number of entries (in different sub segments) have been 
increased, leading to a path of more competitive (though in varying degrees and in 
many cases not effective) telecommunications market relative to monopoly period.  
 
In the field of GSM technology, mobile telecommunication services started with 
licenses which were granted to two operators namely Turkcell and Telsim in 1994. In 
this context, Burnham (2007) asserts that the acceleration in mobile phone 
subscribers after 1998 was stimulated by increased competition following the 
termination of Turk Telekom’s (incumbent operator) control over mobile phone tariffs 
                                                 
19 Please see ‘3G mobile telecommunication systems and studies in Turkey regarding the submittal of UMTS 
licenses’ available at http://www.tgm.gov.tr/tkekseni2/ing/3ging.HTM 
20 This name is changed to ‘Information Technologies and Communications Authority’ from 
Telecommunications Authority at the end of 2008, but for the sake of simplicity TA abbreviation is used in this 
work.   17
and the issuance of 25 year licenses to these two operators. There were not any 
other operators until 2001. The bidding for the third license for installment and 
operation of a GSM 1800 network was won by Turkiye Is Bankasi and Telecom Italia 
Mobile consortium (Aria) in 2000. Finally, Turk Telekom (fixed incumbent operator) 
started to operate the fourth mobile operator as Aycell in 2001 (OECD, 2002). 
However, Aycell and Aria established AVEA mobile subsidiary company as a result of 
merger. The last development in the mobile telecommunication sector was to sell of 
Telsim, the second biggest mobile operator, to Vodafone. Vodafone made the 
highest bid of $4.55 billion (2.6 billion pounds) in an open auction tender
21. Currently, 
three GSM operators exist in Turkey.  
 
3.1. Market penetration and fixed to mobile substitution 
 
Before proceeding with the market structure, I want to briefly analyze the diffusion of 
GSM in the country and the observed trend of fixed to mobile substitution. There 
were two operators in the market until 2000 and it is observed that growth in absolute 
terms accelerated after 1998. 
 
Table 1: The Number of Mobile Subscribers  (till  2000)    (000) 
Years  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
The number of mobile 
phone subscribers 
175 437 806 1,610  3,506  8,122  16,133 
Source: Atiyas, Doğan (2007) 
 
After 2000, late comers entered the market, further increasing the total number of 







                                                 
21Please see ‘Vodafone pays 4.55 bln for Turkey’s Telsim’ available at http://www.talktalk.co.uk/ 
business/news/reuters/2005/12/13/vodafonepays455blnforturkey39stelsim.html   18
Table 2: The Number of Mobile Subscribers (from 2000 to present)    (mil) 

















* As of 09.2009 
Source: ICT (Telecommunications) Authority (www.btk.gov.tr) 
 
On the other hand, in the fixed line telephony market, the total number of subscribers 
has been stabilized between 18-19 million starting from 2002. Furthermore, the 
number has been decreased below 18 million for the first time in 2008, indicating the 
pressure of mobile communications alternative to the fixed one (Table 3). Indeed, the 
fixed line operator’s voice revenues have also declined in recent years as opposed to 




Table 3: The Number of Fixed Line  Subscribers        (mil) 


















* As of 09.2009 
Source: ICT (Telecommunications) Authority (www.btk.gov.tr) 
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One can easily observe from the above figure that the penetration rate of mobile 
telephony (GSM) has been continuously increasing since the introduction of this 
service, following s-shaped pattern. Furthermore, the number of mobile subscribers 
would reach around 63 million by the end of 2008. With penetration rates exceeding 
90%, it may not be wrong to say that the fixed to mobile substitution process will 
increase further in the medium term.  
 
3.2. Market Share Developments 
 
As mentioned above, GSM services were started in 1994 by two companies, Turkcell 
and Telsim
23 through joint venture agreements with the incumbent operator, Turk 
Telekom. According to revenue sharing agreements with Turk Telekom, 33% of the 
revenues were retained by these operators with the condition that all network 
investments made by them, but the ownership of these infrastructures remained in 
the incumbent firm (Yılmaz, 2000). The revenue agreements were replaced by 25 
year licenses for 500 million US$ (for each license) in 1998. According to Atiyas and 
Doğan (2007), this can be regarded as the turning point in the market since after 
obtaining these licenses the ownership of network was passed to these operators, 
increasing both investment levels and price competition
24. More importantly, between 
November 1995 and July 1996 the activities of Telsim were suspended and this 
effectively made Turkcell as the first comer in the market due to the fact that (as 
shown in the above examples) during the first phases of the diffusion process, it is 
more easier to increase market share by creating consumer loyalty (switching costs, 
contractual agreements
25, brand name image as opposed to bad reputation of the 
other firm due to this suspension). Hence, although the number of subscribers has 
been continuously increasing, the market shares of the operators are more important 
for the competitive level of the market itself. In this respect, Table 4 shows market 
shares of the mobile operators in the duopoly period (1994-2000). 
 
 
                                                 
23 Turkcell started operations as a partnership between Sonem Holding (now Telia Sonera) and Cukurova 
Holding while Telsim was founded by Rumeli Holding (a Turkish group owned by Uzan family). 
24 Before this time, tariffs were determined by Turk Telekom. 
25 As mentioned in the previous part, provisions of handsets were the main promotional activities during this 
period. In fact, Turkcell’s distribution of some brands of GSM handsets such as Ericcson and excluding the other 
operator led to complaints and Competition Authority’s investigation related to this issue.   20
Table 4: Market Shares of Early  Comers  (1994-2000)  *     (%) 
Years  Turkcell  Telsim 
1994 78  22 
1995 68  32 
1996 80  20 
1997 77  23 
1998 69  31 
1999 69  31 
2000 69  31 
Source: Competition Authority (Board Decision: 01-35/347-95) 
*In terms of number of subscribers. 
 
Besides, in terms of usage minutes also Telsim was far behind the market leader, as 
seen in the following table; 
 
Table  5:  Call  Minutes  per  User         (min) 
Years  Turkcell  Telsim 
1998 164  69,3 
1999 132,9  59,14 
2000 125  45,57 
Source: Competition Authority (Board Decision: 01-35/347-95) 
 
The call minutes per user clearly showed that the market power of Turkcell, in fact 
was much more than the market share figures. One can also deduct from this, that 
more valuable (in terms of expenditure levels) customers such as business people 
(as in the case of other European incumbent firms stated above) selected Turkcell’s 
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Source: www.internethaber.com, www.hangioperatorcom, www.turkcell.com.tr, www.gedik.com.tr, 
www.ıtu.int 
 
After the introduction of GSM 1800 operators
26 in 2001, it can be seen from Figure 2 
that some minor changes have occurred throughout the period. Dominant operator 
Turkcell’s market share has been declined slightly since 2003 (but still well above 50 
% percent level). Indeed, Burnham (2007) argues that the rapid growth of mobile 
telephony in Turkey has been led by Turkcell in recent years. On the other hand, 
Vodafone, which is a relatively newcomer to the market, has begun to increase her 
market share since 2004. It is expected that the operators will be faced with more 
competition in the short term especially after the introduction of number portability. 
Additionally the entry of Vodafone which is the world's largest mobile phone company 
may increase the competition in the market in the long run. As indicated above 
although the dominant operator’s market share has decreased from app. 80 % levels 
to app. 55-58 % range, the competitive performance of the sector is still far from 
satisfactory compared to other country’s statistics. In fact by using Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI), one can conclude that this market is among the most 






                                                 
26 Eventually they merged into one operator, Avea and Telsim was sold to Vodafone as mentioned in the market 
evolution section.   22
Figure 3: HHI levels in different countries 
 
Source: Int. Communications Market, OFCOM 2007 and author’s own calculations. 
 
Of course, there are various reasons for this outcome. As seen from the previous 
discussion, in the early market creation stage, temporary suspension of the activities 
of Telsim clearly gave first mover advantages to Turkcell and it was evident that this 
firm, by devising efficient strategies (handset provision etc.), further increased its 
market power (as indicated in market share and call volume data). Secondly, the 
latecomers also struggled to achieve market shares and the merger of Aria and 
Aycell in 2004 apparently demonstrated the inability of these companies to compete 
with market leader.
27In this context Atiyas and Doğan (2007) argue that the most 
important reason for this outcome is the first comer advantage given to Turkcell due 
to licensing policy of the government. Furthermore, they conclude that network 
externalities and switching costs along with regulatory delays (e.g. roaming, number 
portability etc.) have all contributed to this asymmetrical market shares.
 Without going 
into detailed discussions, one can mention two regulatory failures (due to incumbent 
operator’s strategies) in the competition policy. First one was the inability of the 
regulatory authority to impose roaming obligations on the incumbent operators. Here 
the delaying tactics (court procedure, application to international court of arbitration) 
of the market leader were the crucial factor and could be regarded as pre- emptive 
strategy from the view point of this operator. Secondly, the increase of 
interconnection rates from 1,4 US cent/min to 20 US cent/min (increase of app. 14 
times) just after the market entry of new comers gave additional competition difficulty 
                                                 
27 Before the merger, Aria (Telecom Italia) threatened to apply to international arbitration court for violation of 
license agreements. Afterwards the two prime ministers of each country met related to this issue and in the end 
the merger decison was made as a compromise (solution). Please see for details ‘HSBC Daily Bulletin- 13 May 
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because of the (much) stated on-net and off-net tariff differentials. This act was also 
investigated by Competition Authority
28 and again with a considerable time delay, 
regulatory authority finally set termination charges of each operator
29 
30. These 
regulatory experiences indicate the fact that, what matters more is the initial license 
policy and with sequential entry (in fact with a long lead time for incumbents) the 
efforts to create more competition in the market would most likely fail (in more 
optimistic terms; costly, time consuming and ineffective). In the end, it can be said 
that both the introduction of new technologies and further regulatory intervention is 
necessary for the establishment of more effective competition in Turkish GSM 
market. In this regard; introduction of 3G, number portability, mobile virtual network 
operator services are very important new technology tools that must be implemented 
effectively in the very short term
31. From this, the auction of 3G licenses made in 
September 2007, but after the announcement that leading GSM operator got the 
license, TA cancelled this auction. The main reason behind this was that only one 
operator entered the auction and the authority believed that the dominant position of 
this undertaking would be further increased if the auction had not been cancelled
32. 
Afterwards another auction was made in November 2008 and each three (existing) 
operators got 3G licenses
33. Here also Turkcell got the most valuable license (giving 
more bandwidth capacity), indicating its plans to offer alternative data services in the 
future. Unfortunately, there was no demand for the fourth 3G license. I think that this 
was expected taking into consideration the historical developments and current 
market situation. Thirdly, it can be argued that that, mobile virtual network service 
(MVNO) may contribute to the competitive level of the market -for near future- from 
the point of view of the development of service based competition by means of 
increasing service diversification in the mobile market. As stated by OECD (2007) 
allowing market entry to MVNOs is important and these newcomers should be 
subjected to light handed regulation. In this context also, the regulatory work has 
                                                 
28 No infringement of Competition Law was found in this investigation by the Board in spite of the findings of 
the report (i.e. competition experts’ findings).  
29 13 cent/min. for calls terminating at Turkcell and Telsim networks, 17 cent/min. for calls terminating at Aria 
and Aycell Networks. 
30 For more detailed discussion of these topics, please see Atiyas and Doğan (2007) and Atiyas (2005). 
31 Among these regulatory work, MNP will be evaluated in a more detailed way in the next subsection. 
32 Please see, ‘3G İhalesi yine iptal’ available at http://www.teknotimes.com/Telekom/Cep-Telefonu/21.html (in 
Turkish) 
33Please see, ‘3G’de beklenen oldu’ available at http://turk.internet.com/haber/yazigoster.php3?yaziid=22530 (in 
Turkish) 
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been continuing and it is important that regulatory authority supports the market entry 
(e.g. provision of access etc.) of these new operators against the existing GSM 
operators.  
 
3.3. Mobile Number Portability 
 
Legislation related to number portability had been completed much earlier but (again) 
Turkcell had appealed to the court and this further delayed the process. With this 
delay, mobile number portability has been finally introduced as of November 2008
34. 
In what follows, this legal background and current situation have been evaluated to 
see the market reaction and the effect of MNP on the market structure. In fact, 
related legislative work had been started in the year 2005 and MNP ordinance came 
into force as of February 2007. This ordinance covers all three basic ways of number 
portability; address, service and operator change. However, only principles and 
procedures of operator change (with the same number) have been defined in 
detailed terms. Besides this, both mobile and fixed number portability
35 are 
addressed in this ordinance.  
 
As expected, the first comer opposed MNP and tried several measures to stop or at 
least delay the implementation date. Indeed, Turkcell applied to the Council of State 
against the MNP ordinance in March, 2007 and they claimed that since 0530- 0539 
number range given to them by concession agreement dated 1998, they had 
property rights and these were not transferable to other operators. On the other hand 
smaller operator, Avea worked and lobbied in favor of MNP. One can only look at one 
of the speeches of the CEO of Avea in this period to see their attitude; ‘…we are 
astonished to see Turkcell’s actions to stop (delay) MNP which will bring freedom to 
choose for consumers…and we continue our efforts to provide MNP to all users in 
spite of this opposition and delaying tactics.’
36 
 
                                                 
34 http://www.tk.gov.tr/Basin_Duyurular/Duyurular/nt/ntasinabirligi.htm (in Turkish) 
35 The implementation of fixed number portability is not started yet, it is planned that this will come into effect in 
2010.  
36 Please see, CEO of Avea, Mr. Türktan’s speech available at http:// turk. internet. com/ haber/ yazigoster. php3 
? yaziid= 19707 (in Turkish)   25
In the meantime, another regulatory development closely related with MNP was the 
3G auctions and it can be said that owing to these delaying tactics, the first auction 
made in September 2007 were cancelled. Only Turkcell entered into this auction and 
the other two operators did not participate and indicate that unavailability of MNP 
were their main reasons for this action.
37 
 
After this painful period, MNP finally started in November 2008 and available data 
from media indicate that leading operator has gained the most subscription 
(219,622), followed by Avea (110,727) and Vodafone (82,654, in fact on the other 
side this operator lost 202,662) showing the results of one month period. 
Nevertheless with aggressive advertising and promotional campaigns smaller 
operators gained competitive advantages and they eventually surpassed the first 
comer operator in terms of ported numbers. In overall figures, after one year of the 
start date, total number reached to app. 8.8 million as of November 2009. This figure 
corresponds to nearly % 14 of 67 million mobile users in this country and such a big 
amount in one year time period shows the effect of MNP in market dynamics. 
 
Table 6: Ported Numbers between operators (as of Nov, 2009) 
Operator  Avea  Turkcell  Vodafone   Gain 
Avea   1.723.745  1.124.089  2.847.834 
Turkcell 1.283.422    1.440.947  2.724.369 
Vodafone 993.022  2.262.267   3.255.289 
Loss  2.276.444  3.986.012  2.565.036   
Source: www.turk.internet.com and operator web sites 
 
Table 7: Ported Numbers between operators  (as of Nov, 2009)        (%) 
Operator  Avea  Turkcell  Vodafone 
Avea   61  39 
Turkcell 47    53 
Vodafone 31  69   
Source: www.turk.internet.com and operator web sites 
 
                                                 
37 Please note that, after the implementation of MNP, 3G licences have been given to each existing GSM 
operator in the country.    26
As evident from tables 6-8, Turkcell got approximately same numbers in percentage 
terms from other operators and other operators captured mostly from the dominant 
operator.  
 
Table 8: Ported Numbers between operators  (as of Nov, 2009)        (%) 
Operator  Gain  Loss  Difference 
Avea 32  26  6 
Turkcell 31  45  -14 
Vodafone 37  29  8 
Source: www.turk.internet.com and operator web sites 
 
Although the total number and market dynamics can be considered as beneficial to 
market competition, one can add some other explanations for this figure. For instance 
it is suggested that authorized operator’s subscription (consumer relation) offices 
have acted to increase MNP numbers to get bonus and premiums from this process. 
Taking into this, a new measure has been enacted to stop second porting after the 
first MNP made by a user for three month period (i.e. waiting period)
38.  
 
After observing the recent developments and some of the possible reasons of poor 
competitive performance, it may be suitable to pass on the demand side of the issue. 
 
4. Strengthening the First Comer Advantage in Turkish GSM Market; Consumer 
Preferences 
 
This part starts with the analysis of the differentiation strategies used by the three 
operators. Then, by making reference to the consumer poll (from now on stated as 
TA’s survey)
39 conducted by TA and more recent one made by the author, consumer 





                                                 
38 Please see, ‘1. yılın sonunda numara taşınabilirliği sonuçları’ available at www.turk.internet.com (in Turkish) 
39 In this survey, interviews and face to face conversations were made with 4322 households. The time period of 
the survey is 05.08-02.12.2006.    27
4.1. Differentiation Strategies 
 
All GSM operators have marketing strategies more or less same with each other. At 
most there exists a time lag between the first application and matching applications 
and strategies will be adopted by others. For instance, when mobile handsets were 
started to be given to subscribers, the others followed with the same strategy without 
much delay. With this observation in mind, each firms strategies in terms of services, 
tariff (pricing) packages and promotions (mobile handsets etc.) will be analyzed in 
general terms, starting with evaluation of each operator’s web site in terms of 
services provided to users (Annex-2). 
 
For the tariff packages, comparison is very difficult to make since many kinds of 
differentiation exist among the operators. The main separation is the post- paid and 
pre- paid differentiation. In these two categories one can find various packages 
ranging from nearly unlimited calls (e.g. 1000 minutes) with a predetermined fee to 
same network vs. different network (on-net vs. off-net) usage plans. In this context, 
Atiyas and Doğan (2007; 514-517) argue that high termination charges have 
restricted the ability of the operators to compete aggressively by lowering tariffs and 
they instead have developed various menu of tariffs for subscribers with different 
profiles for off net calls. In fact one can see this by taking examples from the tariff 
packages. For instance, Avea has devised a tariff package under the name of ‘public 
sector tariff’ giving the subscribers 1000 minutes of talk in the same network with a 
fee of app. 9,23 euro
40. On the other hand, Turkcell’s comparable tariff package costs 
were discontinued to give priority to other tariff packages devised after the 
implementation of MNP. However the trend is interesting because of the tendency to 
lower tariffs for same network calls in the name of ‘public’ etc. This is clearer if we 
compare these tariff packages with the previously applied ones; e.g. in one of the 
previous packages; Turkcell charged the same amount for 1200 minutes instead of 
200 minutes of call
41, also Avea previously applied 600 minutes limitation to a 
comparable package currently offering 1000 minutes of talk. These can be regarded 
as ‘matching strategies’ and may be given an indication that demand elasticity in the 
market is high. Apart from this, as mentioned previously, the effect of MNP has been 
                                                 
40 The fixed fee is 19,39 TL including VAT and  special tax for 1000 min. free call. (1 €= 2,1 YTL) 
41 These tariffs were closed to new subscriptions.    28
very interesting to see on the tariff structures of the operators. After MNP, all 
operators are starting to offer ‘to every direction’
42 tariff packages. In this category, 
although not exactly same, one comparable tariff package is selected for comparison 
in the below table. 
 
Table 9: New Type (every direction) tariffs 
Operator  Fixed fee (€)  Given talk time (min) 
      On- net                             Off- net 
Avea 14,3  1250 250 
Vodafone   14,3  3000  300 
Turkcell 7,14  150 
Source: Operator web sites 
 
Another effect of MNP is the introduction of promotional campaigns to get new 
customers and new customer loyalty schemes to existing subscribers that have less 
switching cost concerns. For instance, Avea offers reductions in monthly bills for their 
customers who are promising to stay in the network for predetermined periods. 
Besides this, all three operators have devised various ‘transfer advantages’ to attract 
other operator’s users to their networks (Table-10). 
 
Table 10: Promotion campaigns 
Operator  Transfer advantages 
Turkcell   1000 min free usage 
Avea  1200 min free usage 
Vodafone  1500 min free usage 
Source: Operator web sites 
 
For the promotions other than tariff plans, the operators distribute mobile handsets in 
various contractual agreements. In this category, Vodafone seems to be more 
aggressive and among other offers (starting from as low as 15,8 euro for Vodafone 
225 handset) have begun begin to provide popular ‘apple iphone’ handset in the 
country along with the market leader, Turkcell. Without going into further detail, 
                                                 
42 It means same price for on net and of net calls.   29
although it is very difficult to draw concise borders and using the terminology of 
Limkeatcherdchoo et. al. (2005), it can be argued that Avea (the smallest one in 
terms of market shares) is more concerned with the price competition by devising low 
cost tariff packages. Turkcell, on the other hand, seems to be targeting what is called 
the crème de la crème portion of the customers. To give an example, one can make 
reference to the CEO of Turkcell, Mr. Ciliv’s statements related to the marketing 
strategy. According to him decreasing market share of the company (app. 2-3 % in 
the last year) is not so important since they are targeting valuable (in his words) 
customers. Indeed, a very rough comparison
43 of ARPU levels of operators may be 
used to prove this statement. 
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4.2. Evaluation of Consumer Preferences  
 
According to the TA’s survey results consumers give more importance to coverage, 
quality of service and tariff packages in selecting GSM operators. In the report it is 
stated that consumers give 4.5 to coverage, 4.42 to quality of service, 4.28 to tariff 
packages, 4.25 to network externality (i.e. calling family members, friends etc. in the 
same network), 4.24 to customer services, 3.95 to promotions, 3.04 to value added 
services such as game, melody etc. and 3.85 to brand name of the operator out of 
the 5 total score. The more interesting finding is what can be called customer loyalty. 
The results indicate that nearly 70 % of mobile phone users did not change their 
operator before this time.  
                                                 
43 Exact comparisons can not be made in this category since ARPU of the operators is not publicly available.   30
 
For the selection of tariff packages, network externalities are very important and 
consumers want to speak with their family members and close friends. In parallel with 
the survey findings, all three operators have tried to benefit from this phenomenon by 
devising various on net- off net tariff packages. It is evident that dominant operator 
with the largest subscriber base has more advantage in this respect and is able to 
hold existing customers relatively more easily than the other two operators. In fact, 
the survey indicates the fact that approximately 80 % of the respondents know the on 
net- off net price differentials and act accordingly to minimize their expenditures. 
 
The other survey
44, although very limited compared to TA’s in terms of scale, made 
by the author also confirms the fact that for consumers that have permanent income 
levels, coverage and quality of service come first in selecting the operator. This, of 
course, does not mean that pricing is not important, but for some customers even 
brand image etc. is a factor in selecting an operator. In general terms, pre- paid 
customers are in relatively lower income levels and tend to put much emphasis in 
minimizing communication expenditure. In this category, communication with 
messaging is more common. These expenditure patterns are not surprising taking 
into account the relatively unequal income distribution of the country. In addition to 
this, one can observe the increasing popularity of so called ‘public tariffs’ that 
allowing virtually unlimited calls (though in varying degrees) between the subscribers 
of the same package. As argued in Birke and Swann (2007), the survey shows that 
popularity (preference) of these tariff packages among consumers have been 
continuously increasing, which shows the importance of close group (i.e. household 
members, friends and/or colleagues in business) in making subscription decisions. 
Apart from this, it is observed that some people try to minimize their expenditure by 
using different operators when making off-net calls, and this is especially more 
common among the people who are informed (knows) about on-net and off-net 
pricing strategies of the operators. For number portability’s effect on users, because 
of the size limitations of the survey, it is difficult to find any definite pattern but in any 
case this new application has lead to reduction in switching costs, in turn creating 
more competition in the market. In very general terms, those people in higher income 
                                                 
44 The survey questions can be found in annex-3.   31
brackets give more value to their numbers and for them, quality and coverage 
concerns are important factors along with tariff levels to change their networks. 
Contrary to this, for the people in the lower income brackets, other than those 
subscribed to pre- paid tariffs, new promotional packages and transfer advantages 
are considered as important factors to number porting decisions.  
 
On the other hand, even this limited evidence suggests that people mainly use 
mobile telephony for voice transmission and for message sending (sms) purposes. 
Both because of price and download capacity (speed) concerns, most people do not 
prefer to use internet from their handsets. This may also give an indication for 
operators that with the start of 3G, those who develop more alternative data services 
(e.g. mobile TV) at more competitive prices may be able to gain market share
45 at the 
expense of others. 
 
One final consideration from the survey findings is that both public institutions (TA) 
and the operators should use all possible means to inform the consumers about the 
coverage, quality of service and of course tariff options. By this way, customers will 
have more information and can make better decisions in selecting their operator. In 
fact, in the 2008 work plan of TA, it is stated that studies related to the public 
availability of quality of service criteria of GSM operators would be completed before 
the end of 2008, but actual implementation is not observed yet (may be due to some 




In sum, it is not wrong to say that Turkcell- the dominant operator- due to her first 
comer advantage- has established very well known brand name and reputation in 
terms of coverage and quality of service throughout the country. Apart from ex ante 
issues such as roaming, number portability etc., consumers appreciate the services 
offered by this operator though in varying degrees depending on their income levels, 
as seen from the survey results. Turkcell’s leading role in the e-commerce services 
                                                 
45 I mean, one can think 3G as a new sub segment of market in which interested users are more informed and 
price sensitive. In this respect, any operator can attract these groups of consumers at the start, by implementing 
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can be given as an example for showing that consumers that have relatively higher 
income levels tend to prefer this operator compared to others.  
 
Before concluding, it can be argued that introduction of number portability and MVNO 
services supported by other measures such as the availability of quality of service 
data may contribute to the competitive performance of the sector. In fact, as the new 
tariff packages, promotions and changing user attitudes due to decreasing switching 
costs indicate; MNP has a definite effect- from the start- on the competitive level and 
dynamics of the market. However, it is too early to draw definite conclusions from the 
implementation of number portability, also due to lack of publicly available data which 
is (as well as) a serious problem in other categories including market shares, traffic 
volumes for researchers in this area. In this respect, the regulatory authority should 
disclose more market data and at the same time force operators to give (publish) 
public more information including quality of service indicators to decrease (in some 
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Annex-1: MNP Implementation in Europe         
Country  Max. Porting Time 
(day) 
Ported Numbers (000) 
Austria  3  321 (end of 2007) 
Belgium  1-2  151 (end of 2006) 
Denmark  3-5 2.546 
Finland  5 4.300 
France  10 2.400 
Germany  15-30  1.573 (end of 2007) 
Greece  10 581 
Ireland  2-8 (hour)  82 
Italy  5 16.100 
Luxembourg  3 72 
Holland  10  2.180 (end of 2007) 
Norway  5 3.400 
Portugal  5-20 196 
Spain  5 16.000 
Sweden  5 3.070 
Switzerland  5  151 (end of 2006) 
England  2 --- 
Bulgaria  10 --- 
Croatia  5 41 
Czech Republic  5  164 (end of 2007) 
Estonia  13-15 37 
Hungary  8 220 
Lithuania  5 252 
Malta  1 42 
Latvia  10 24  (2007) 
Poland  38 228 
Romania  10  0.28 (2.800- first ten days/2008) 
Slovakia  20 16 
Slovenia  3 --- 
Macedonia  14 0.279  (279) 
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Annex-2: Services offered by GSM Operators*** 
Type of Voice Services  Turkcell  Vodafone  Avea 
Call Catcher  Yes (no charge)  Yes (no charge)  Yes (with a charge) 
Payment by the other party  Yes  Different form*  Yes 
Answering Service  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Call waiting/holding  Yes  Yes  NF** 
Call Divert  Yes  Yes  NF** 
Video Calling (3G)  No  No  No 
Messaging & Mobile 
Internet Services 
Turkcell  Vodafone  Avea 
Text SMS  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Voice SMS  Yes  Yes  Yes 
MMS Yes  Yes  Yes 
Win. Live Messenger  Yes  NF**  Yes 
Push to Talk  Yes  NF**  Yes 
Web messaging  Yes  NF**  Yes 
Mobile Internet  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Other (Music, Game etc.)  Yes  Yes  Yes 
New Application Services  Turkcell  Vodafone  Avea 
E-commerce (E-Signature)  Yes  NF**  NF** 
Services for Disabled  Turkcell  Vodafone  Avea 
Support services, voice 
SMS etc. 
Yes NF**  NF** 
Assistance Services  Turkcell  Vodafone  Avea 
Directory service, mobile 
payment etc. 
Yes Yes  Yes 
Source: Websites of the operators. 
* Different kind of service is found and may be considered as having the same functionality. 
** Not found in the web site, does not necessarily implies that the service and/or a substitute 
not available. 
***Please note that in terms of services offered by operators, first thing to be mentioned is 
that the web sites of the operators are not comparable to get exact conclusions. Although 
somehow subjectively, Turkcell’s web site is more user friendly and nearly all the things that 
the user want to reach can be found more easily than the other operators. In this category 
Avea’s web site is the most complicated and the services offered by the company are not 
stated in a separate and clear format. In any case, Turkcell is also the leading operator in this 
category with the new and innovative services such as mobile commerce using e signature 
and forming a separate section for the disabled people in its website. On the other hand, 
Avea’s implementation of some services is rather confusing taking into consideration that this 
operator’s market share is the least among the three and one example of this is the offering 
of ‘call catcher’ service with a fee.   38
 
Annex-3: Survey Questions 
 
1- What is your main source of income? 
( ) Full time Job  ( ) Part time Job  ( ) Temporary (seasonal) job 
( ) Family allowance    (  )  Social Security payments (unemployment 
payments etc.) 
( ) Other, please specify 
 
2- Please indicate your income category (in TL) 
( ) 50-250  ( ) 250- 500    ( ) 500- 1.000    ( ) 1.000- 1.500  (  ) 
1.500- 2.000   ( ) 2.000- 2.500  ( ) 2.500- more 
 
3- How much is your average monthly expenditure related to GSM?  
( ) 10-30  ( ) 30-50  ( ) 50-75  ( ) 75-100  ( ) 100-150  ( ) 150-200 
( ) 200 ve üzeri 
 
 
4- To which operator are you subscribed? 
( ) Avea  ( ) Vodafone   ( ) Turkcell 
 
5-What kind of factors influenced your subscription decision? (Tick more than one if 
necessary) 
( ) Quality of service     ( ) Coverage   ( ) Pricing  ( ) Brand name  
( ) Promotions      ( ) My family, relatives (subscribed to this operator)         
( ) Friend advice     ( ) Advertisements    ( ) Random Selection           
( ) Other, please specify: 
 
6- For what purpose are you using your mobile phone (and service)? (Please indicate 
the app. percentage of usage) 
( ) Voice transmission  ( ) Data (internet) transmission  ( ) SMS   
( ) Other, please specify 
 
7- Are you aware of on net-off net price differentiation?   ( ) Yes  ( ) No 
 
8- If yes, are you using different operators when making calls to different operators?  
 
9- Have you ever changed your operator? If yes how many times? 
 
10- What is the reason for changing your operator last time? 
(  )  Service  quality  is  not  adequate  ( ) Price is more expensive compared to 
others   ( ) Coverage problems  ( ) Assistance services are not adequate 
( ) My family, relatives (subscribed to this operator) 
 
11-  Which criteria are more important for you in selecting your current operator? 
(Please mark starting with 5 according to the importance) 
( ) Quality of service     ( ) Coverage   ( ) Pricing    (  )  Brand 
name     ( ) Promotions      ( ) My family, relatives (subscribed to 
this operator)    ( ) Other, please specify: 
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12- If you have not changed your operator at all, please state the main reasons 
(starting from 1 indicating the most important one, if you select more than one) for 
this preference. 
( ) Adequate pricing   ( ) Better quality      ( ) Better coverage   
( ) My family, relatives (subscribed  to  this  operator)  ( ) number preference (i.e. 
using same number for years)     ( ) Other, please specify: 
 
13- What is your tariff package name? Please specify (e.g. kamu, kampüscell etc.): 
 
14- If you are using ‘public tariff packages’ (kamu tarifeleri), what are the main 
reasons for selecting this tariff? 
( ) My family, relatives (used this package)    ( ) My friends, (used this 
package)         ( ) My colleagues (used this package for business)  
( ) Other, please specify: 
 
15-Are you aware of number portability (MNP)? 
( ) Yes    ( ) No 
 
16- If yes, please indicate the source of information? 
( ) İnternet  ( ) Newspaper   ( ) Friend  ( ) Other, please state:  
 
17- Do you think that MNP will bring some benefits? 
( ) Yes    ( ) No 
 
18- If yes, please indicate the most important benefits (starting from one) 
( ) Lower tariffs  ( ) Higher quality  ( ) Promotions 
( ) Other please state: 
 
19- Are you considering to change your operator, after the implementation of MNP? 
( ) Yes    ( ) No 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 